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The Jewish Question in the New Republic: 1919- 1924
In light of the possibly vindictive and crippling reparations which would be
imposed on the Weimar Republic by the Treaty of Versailles, prominent members of the
German-Jewish community encouraged the Weimar leadership to revisit the Jewish
question in March 1919. For although the Weimar Constitution spelled out the rights of
German citizens, the leadership of the new republic held a conference in which they
discussed how and whether those rights would apply to immigrants, who, because of the
new territorial boundaries of the peace conference, now found themselves outside of
Germany. The immigration and the fear of a major influx of Jewish immigrants flooding
the borders, required the Weimar leadership to analyze how they would respond and deal
with the Jews, both within and without Germany. This paper will analyze the early years
of the Weimar Republic through historiography and mainly three primary sources: the
Treaty of Versailles (as it is pertains to the reparations and the territory adjustments of
Germany), the Weimar Constitution (as it pertains to the rights of the German citizens as
well as minorities, and finally the March 1919 conference which was meant to discuss the
Jewish question. Prominent members of the German-Jewish community seized the
opportunity afforded them by the imminent reparations of the Treaty of Versailles to get
the Weimar government to take action in regards to the Jewish questions and stopping the
discrimination against Jews.
The Jewish question has referred specifically to how governments, in this case:
Germany, would respond to the Jews in the laws and rights that governments would
award to the Jews, but also particularly in the limiting of the discrimination which had
been so rampart throughout Europe toward the Jews. The Weimar Republic, like much
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of Europe had many citizens who were Jews and had to decide whether to expand the
rights of minorities to equal those of German descent. To the Republic’s credit, the
government did grant full citizen’s rights to the long-denied Jews, but only those who
now lived within the new borders of the state.
So leading figures in the German-Jewish community grasped the moment when
the German government was still reeling from the lost war and the upcoming harshness
of the Treaty of Versailles, the German-Jews called for a conference to discuss six points
which made of their wish list, their deepest desires. They did not necessarily believe that
the points would be accepted but they presented it in such a way that the Weimar
government could not refuse. The leaders of the Jewish community in Germany stated
that if the government formulated a plan, which the government could then present to the
League of Nations, then perhaps, as a result of their intuitive action, the League of
Nations would be more lenient in the upcoming treaty and reparations which were to be
imposed upon Germany alone.
The Weimar Republic was established in 1918 after the German Revolution and
thus ended the German Empire. It was the first democracy in Germany and, according to
Detlev Peukert’s The Weimar Republic, it struggled to prove its legitimacy and claim to
power. The beginning of the Republic was not made obvious by an event that could be
used as a political unifying symbol of a pivotal moment in the country’s history such as
the American Declaration of Independence, or the Sedan Day after the creation of the
German Empire in 1870-71. 1
Instead of having such a momentous event, Philip Scheidemann, the deputy leader
of the Social Democrats, gave birth to the republic quite by accident and only to prevent
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the Soviet-style revolutionary, Karl Liebknecht, from taking power as he marched toward
the Reichstag with his forces. 2 Scheidemann decided that the development had to be
prevented and quickly so he impulsively declared the formation of the new republic.
However, when Scheidemann proclaimed the republic, there was no constitution and not
even a plan for one. 3 Scheidemann, as deputy leader had no authority to declare a new
government and Friedrich Ebert “banged his fist on the table and yelled at
[Scheidemann]… ‘You had no right to proclaim the republic.’” 4
However, the commotion which the proclamation had caused could not be halted
as the army did not know whom they should obey, so the impulsive proclamation of the
deputy leader of the Social Democrats could not be taken back. A republic had to be
formed.
When the war was lost, the League of Nations stipulated that a new government
be set up. The Treaty of Versailles also contained a guilt clause, in which Germany had
to take sole responsibility for the war and the reparations that had to be paid in order to
see the rest of Europe to get back on their feet. The guilt clause entailed the loss of 10%
of Germany itself to outside forces, causing a massive 12.5% of the population to
suddenly find themselves out of the new borders and in different countries. 5 Germany
was forced to concede territories to Belgium (Eupen-Malmedy), Czechoslovakia (the
Hultschin district), and Poland (Poznan [German: Posen], West Prussian, and Upper
Silesia). The high reparations caused severe resentment in the Weimar Republic
government and among the German people toward the League of Nations. Although the
French, who were the ones who really pushed the “War Guilt Clause,” knew that there
was little chance that Germany would be able to pay back such a large debt, the hope was
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that Germany would be so limited in its ability to regain its economic superiority that it
would be unable to initiate a new war with France. 6
With the upheaval of the lost war and the struggle to establish a new government,
the first years of the Republic were turbulent. The reparations also caused severe
economic turmoil in Germany, leaving Germans with critical inflation and a lack of jobs,
and looking for someone to blame and that was frequently the government. 7 With the
original main source of employment, agrarianism, declining and the secondary source of
industrialism rising, the economy was upset and from 1919 to 1924, it was in a crisis and
the instability and the lack of legitimacy made people think more fondly on the days of
the monarchy. 8 As the Republic labored to stabilize the nation and the economy, the
officials turned toward a matter they could improve: the Jewish question and what further
rights they would be granted.
As previously mentioned, the Jewish question had become a renewed issue in the
new republic, but it had been an issue in much of Europe but especially Germany, since
the time of the Enlightenment. It was due to the Enlightenment’s arguments for the
toleration of the various religions “on the basis of their shared ethical principles” and the
desire that states ought to “make full use of their human resources instead of excluding
some groups from unrestricted participation in social life.” 9 The Jews received their full
civil rights in Austria in 1867, however, in Germany; they did not receive them until four
years later and there were still many prejudices and laws in place against them. The
government of the Weimar Republic “completed the process of Jewish emancipation in
Germany.” 10 Until that time, Jews had been excluded from obtaining higher positions in
the public service and academic world, but those barriers were removed in the Weimar
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Republic, and the Jews found themselves capable of playing an important part in the
“post-war public life, in the liberal parties and the parties of the left, in universities and
the mass media.” 11
However, despite the new mobility and cultural influence which that Jews had
gained under the Weimar Republic, old sentiments still held strong and the German
Jewry often found themselves facing a rise of anti-Semitic discrimination. Other
problems which faced German Jewry were the fear of the loss of their cultural identity
and faith. Many Jews assimilated into the German culture, which surrounded them,
forgetting their roots and traditions. The Orthodox Jews and the Zionist attempted to
combat this assimilation through different methods. 12
Martin Buber was a Jewish philosopher best known for his philosophy of
dialogue. He also assisted Franz Rosenzweig set up a school to instruct the third
generation Jews on their heritage and culture, he proclaimed cultural Zionism, which
emphasized the need to live culturally as Jews and that it was more important to be a Jew,
who lived as a Jew, than it was to have a national home; dedicated only to Jews as the
political Zionists wanted.
A challenge to the German-Jewish identity was the immigration of the Ostjuden,
or the Jews from Eastern Europe. These immigrants had very different ways and
traditions than the German Jewish community. The Ostjuden differed from their German
counterparts socially, culturally and in their forms of worship and these dissimilarities
caused conflicts within the Jewish community itself. Also due to their strange accents
and unfamiliar forms of behavior, the Ostjuden became a particular focus for anti-Semitic
prejudice between the Jewish communities in Germany. Because of the crises that the
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economy of the Republic was suffering, the foreign migrant workers were unwelcome
and were regularly deported by the German authorities. Although the Jews suffered a
terrible fate in the Holocaust, the early years of the Weimar Republic are not solely
responsible for the events which allowed for and defined the Holocaust. The Republic’s
instability and inability to establish political legitimacy facilitated a need to work the
system and try to find stability and to promote human rights.
The historiography of the plight of the Jews in Germany is extensive. Even in
pertaining only with the Weimar Republic, there are several excellent secondary sources.
As this is a short thesis and not a book, this paper will only address the secondary sources
of Paul Mendes-Flohr, Karen Schoenwaelder, Detlev Peukert, and Eric D. Weitz.
In Paul Mendes-Flohr’s book, German-Jews: A Dual Identity, (1999), he argues
that the German-Jews fostered two distinct sources for spiritual relief—between Judaism
and European (in this case German) culture. In other words, they found themselves
spiritually fulfilled by being both a Jew and a German. The most crucial part, he states, is
the “and” between the two cultures to protect the integrity of each while keeping an
exchange of ideas.
A few of the primary sources used include a postcard written by Franz Kafka,
Franz Rosenzweig’s beliefs on the Jews’ ability to become Germans also, the words of
rabbi and a cultural coding called Deutschtum. The Jews held firms to the Deutschtum
which said that they were “German by the grace of Goethe.” 13 This in and of itself is
interesting since in the middle ages the Jews were viewed by the Germans as a “people
apart” 14 from the general public. As a result of this exclusion, the Jews, however, Jews
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rushed to join the emerging middle class or the educated class, whereby they partipated in
a form of cultural assimilation.
In the words of a liberal rabbi, Benno Jacob in 1927, the German Jewry were
assimilated in the cultural values of German society but not into the German society. 15
Although the German Jews longed to be accepted as Germans and Jews, they could not
assimilate fully into the German society because of the discriminations against them.
Although they were not fully accepted into German society, Franz Rosenzweig,
who was a Jewish philosopher, who desired the Jews to become both German and Jews,
believed that the Jews could flourish as they had in Babylon when the two cultures had
merged. He believed that German Jewry would reach a cultural maturity, when it had
that it could learn to be both German and Jewish. The importance landing on the “and”
which made it seem possible.
The final primary source is a postcard written by Franz Kafka in 1916. After a
review of one of his literary works, one critic found it “quintessentially German” while
another found it “the representative of Jewish document of [the] time.” 16 In response,
Kafka wrote a postcard to a friend and asked, “Am I a circus acrobat riding astride two
horses? Sadly I am not. Rather I lie flat on my back!” 17 Kafka illustrated the impossible
task which met the German Jews at nearly every turn. Many wanted the Jews to chose
one or the other; to be Jewish or to be German, but even if the latter was chosen the Jews
were frequently not fully integrated into the German society. However, Franz
Rosenzweig believed strongly that the Jews could do remain Jewish and become German,
if only, they would just focus on both cultures instead of one or the other.
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In her analysis of the Constitution, “The Constitutional Protection of Minorities in
Germany: Weimar Revisited,” Karen Schoenwaelder states that the constitutional rights,
which the Weimar government granted to minorities were more likely a reaction to the
possible loss of territories rather than of a concern for the rights of the minorities. In the
Weimar Constitution article 113, it stated that “the state respects the identity of ethnic,
cultural and linguistic minorities.” 18 However, the independent Social Democrat Oskar
Cohn proposed that the wording of the constitution was “insufficient.” 19 He also stated
that “minorities could very well adopt German as their mother tongue, but nevertheless
retain their foreign nationality.” 20 He also wanted Jews to be included, as far as they saw
themselves as a nationality, as a minority. Schoenwaelder believes that Cohn was
possibly the only member of the National Assembly who was seriously and constantly
concerned for the protection of the rights of minorities. She states that although members
of the National Assembly pointed out that the Poles had been oppressed by the German
occupation of the Eastern Marshes, they were quick to point out that the Poles were no
more oppressed than Germany was by its enemies. 21 Despite the introduction of the
article 113 protecting minorities’ rights, assimilation still remained the predominating
perspective for the betterment of Germany.
In The Weimar Republic, Detlev Peukert also argues that with the establishment
of the Weimar Republic, the German Jewry was fully emancipated. 22 However, despite
new-found influence that the German Jews enjoyed, there was a rise in anti-Semitism.
However, this hostility, according to Peukert was directed more toward the Ostjuden,
than to the German Jews themselves. 23
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In Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy, Eric D. Weitz also provides a lot of
in depth context of the Weimar Republic’s rise and decline. Unfortunately, he does not
touch too much on the Jewish question but the context itself makes this secondary source
invaluable to this discussion. This paper has made use of many of the facts about the
Weimar Republic.
The main primary sources which are analyzed in this paper include a conference
held within the Republic, discussing the Jewish question and in particular the policies of
immigration toward the Ostjuden, reparations of the Treaty of Versailles, a letter from a
German official, in response to the treaty, and finally a look at the Weimar Republic.
The importance of the conference to the Jews was enormous. It represented the moment
in history, in which the Jewish question could be brought to the attention of the
government and make them discuss it. Despite the outcome or lack thereof, of the
conference, the Jewish leaders had been heard and considered.
As the Republic attempted to stabilize Germany in the wake of the unsuccessful
First World War, members of the government met in the first of what was to be several
meetings to discuss the Jewish question and to hopefully develop a program, which
would help the League of Nations see that Germany could deal justly with human rights,
and in hopes of preventing League of Nations from inflicting some of the harsh
reparations. Because of the war and the following reparations, the economy, which the
Weimar Republic stepped into was destroyed and the German people were losing faith in
the government. 24 According to Juergen Matthaeus. a German historian, this conference
was to be the first of many to determine how the new German government would handle
the issue of the Jews particularly in Poland, who had previously been a part of Germany
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but due to the Treaty of Versailles, were now a part of Poland. However, when it became
clear May 1919 that the League of Nations would not let up on the reparations, the future
conferences appear not to have taken place or at least there is no record of them
occurring. 25
In the record itself of the debate, there are several principle characters. Presiding
is Johann Heinrich Graf von Bernstorff, who was a former ambassador to the United
States, the presenter of the points of discussion is Professor Moritz S. Sobernheim, Eugen
Fuchs brings the national Jewish view to the debate as a leader of the Centralverein
deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens, Richard Lichtheim takes the stance of the
Zionists, who hoped that sometime in the near future the Jews would acquire a national
home and were in support of the Balfour Declaration, speaking for the Zionistische
Vereinigung für Deutschland, Dr. Lenz of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, and
others speaking more for themselves than for a particular party are Eduard Bernstein and
Walther Rathenau.
Bernstorff begins the discussion by stating that the purpose of the discussion is to
“face [their] enemies (the League of Nations) with a positive programme in hand, a
programme that will solve the problem in principle, through which we will regain worldwide sympathy, and which will prove that a new spirit is at large in Germany.” 26 He
states that the following points have been suggested by members of the German Jewish
community to promote and to emphasize at the peace conference of the League of
Nation.
1) Equality for Jews and Judaism in all countries of the world.
2) Abolition and prohibition of all laws, decrees and regulations containing
restrictive measures applicable exclusively to Jews, especially bans on
immigration and the closing of borders to Jews.
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3) National and cultural autonomy within the new states to the extent demanded
by the majority of Jews living in those parts, while safeguarding minority
rights and arranging for the Sabbath to be taken into account within the legal
framework.
4) Laying down of such political, administrative and economic conditions for
Palestine that its development as an autonomous common wealth, supported
by all Jews, is ensured.
5) Compensation for victims of pogroms by the state concerned.
6) The setting-up of an international committee to watch over the enforcement of
peace-conference principles and decisions that apply to Jews. 27
The debate than went over points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 in detail. Dr. Lenz states that
since these points had not been sent to him previous to the debate he could not comment
in detail about the Ministry’s stance of the points. However, he does say that the reason
for the immigration restrictions of Jews was due to an outbreak of typhoid in Poland.
The restrictions of the immigration was an issue because of the fact that those Jews had
originally been part of Germany in the pre-World War I era and then had been separated
as a condition of the Treaty of Versailles. Dr. Fuchs states that unless the lice which
carried the typhoid only preyed on the Jews then others should also have been excluded
at the borders. He states that he would understand if Germany wished to shut themselves
away from the world but that it should be done on a “national and not on a religious
basis.” 28 He finishes that that world would not understand Germany’s inhumane
treatment of the Jews in such a way.
Bernstein, who was a Social Democrat and a Jew only by descent, but he was still
lumped in as a Jew by other Germans, states that he does not believe that this was a
question of religious denomination and that it is about much more than Judaism. He
states that it is ethnicity that is at the root of the problem. He also states the problem of
immigration and the fear of, of the government, a flood of immigrants from the East were
“vastly exaggerated.” 29 He declares that the majority would be coming in search of work
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and when they did not find it, they would return home. He declares that it is impossible
for them to fight the discriminatory laws of other countries when they have some of their
own.
On point 3, Sobernheim explains that there are places in which national and
cultural autonomy have been granted and minorities have lived peacefully. His example
is the town Czernowitz, Romania, in which Roumanian, German, Ruthenian and Jewish
mayors take turns; they visit each other’s festivals and take part in the national life of
their various communities. He further explains that cultural autonomy would allow for
Jews to observe the Sabbath and work on Sunday if they so desired. Dr. Rathenau
presents the problem that if they advocate that part of a population in certain states
become autonomous then the League of Nations may see it necessary to use it as against
Germany. Dr. Fuchs argues that those concerns are only significant if Germany hoped to
have a dominant position in the East. He states that as a good German (he is a Jew) he
asked himself two questions: “should our Jews in the East have the right to demand
autonomy?” and if they should not have that right “should they be Germanised or
Polonised?” 30 However, he states that as a good German, he cannot allow them to be
Polonised as that would remove support for his fatherland, but neither should they be
Germanised, Dr. Fuchs states that they should keep their “national distinctiveness,” and
according to the principle of the right of self-determination, which was at the time in the
world at large. He states that they should give them the “right to stay in the East with
Jewish nationality.” 31 He argues that if they do not want the Jews to be Polonised by
force than it is in the interest of Germanness to grant them national autonomy, so that
they may stand against the Poles and have a legitimate claim to autonomy. However, he
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states that he would see cultural autonomy as an interference with the sovereignty of the
German people. He then concludes that he has “always found that the well-understood
interests of Deutschtum have never excluded the justified claims of the Jews. These wellunderstood interests, provided they are based on justice, truth and freedom, are
unanimously accepted throughout the world.” 32 Later in the discussion, Fuchs clarifies
that he does not accept the claim that the Jews should be recognized as a nation and that
he sees a strong distinction between the Ostjuden and the Westjuden. He states that there
are roughly 500,000 Jews in Germany, who have the will to belong to Germany
[Deutschtum] as a people. 33
Dr. Lichtheim then takes up the discussion, saying that from the Zionist point of
view, he finds that national autonomy of a minority, if realized completely, could have
very dangerous economic consequences for the minority. If a small group receives a
special status in all areas within a larger group then that can lead to economic exclusion
and cultural alienation. However, he states that Germany will not be forced to broach the
question only to agree or disagree with a solution. If the minority demands autonomy,
Dr. Lichtheim feels that it is necessary to give it to them but not to offer it.
With regards to point 4, it is merely defined and pointed out that it is a
commonwealth under direction of England rather than defined as a national home. On
point 5, they clarify that the compensations must be made by the country involved and
not necessarily by the country, in which the victims live. Dr. Fuchs presents the example
of Haller’s army, which perpetrated a pogrom in Danzig or elsewhere. In that case, it
would be Haller’s country which would need to compensate its victims. In presenting
point 6, Sobernheim explains that the question of humanity is of world-wide significant
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and that the counsel would observe and police laws passed in countries to ensure that no
inhumane treatment or exclusion occurred. Here once again, a Prussian minister speaks
and states that since these points were not brought to his attention so he could not
comment on them but he did ask that they not draw any conclusions from his silence.
The chairman then ends the meeting by saying that the issue was submitted to the
ministries today and they would be grateful if in the near future they received a written or
oral response.
However, since no records have been found of subsequent meetings, it seems that
the issue was dropped and not discussed further. And despite this meeting’s occurance,
no conclusions were made at all in regards to the Jewish question. It seems that the
Republic found more important matters to which they needed to attend.
Considering the fact that Germany did not lose the war, per se, the harshness of
the Treaty of Versailles was surprising and quite unfair. Since no one had won the war,
the treaty should have been more lenient of the opposite side. The treaty was a long
document including 440 articles. It was began in early 1919 and finished in April of
1919 after several months of hard bargaining and it was presented to the German
government on the 7th of May 1919. The German government was only allowed three
weeks to accept the terms of the treaty, which it had not seen previously. The initial
response to the treaty was astonishment. Several objections were made, and the
government asked for a neutral commission to investigate the responsibility of the war
and the culpable acts in conduct. 34
However, despite the objections from the German government, which were
largely ignored by the League of Nations, the Treaty of Versailles was signed on the 28th
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of June 1919. In regards to the territory of Germany, the country was deprived of about
13.5% of its 1914 territory, including overseas colonies, which went mainly to England. 35
The long contested region of Lorraine-Alsace was returned to France and Belgium’s
borders were enlarged to the east. Other territorial adjustments include a portion of
Prussia being handed over to Lithuania and the Sudetenland was given to Poland. These
adjustments of the borders and territories of Germany not only deprived the country of a
massive portion of land but it also deprived the country of some seven million people.
In regards to the economic reparations, although the Allies admitted that Germany
could not possibly pay for all of the damage done, they did expect Germany to pay large
amounts in an attempt to make it right. In addition, Germany had to “make
reimbursement of all sums which Belgium has borrowed from the Allied and Associated
Governments up to November 11, 1918, together with interest at the rate of five per cent
(5%) per annum on such sums.” 36 The amount of the sums would be determined by the
Reparation Commission and it would be that Commission which would accept payment
on behalf of Belgium. The Reparation Commission was also in charge of the payments
for the damages and they would allow for the German government to have a “just”
opportunity to be heard. 37
The Commission was to examine the damage done to the various countries and
then by or before May 1, 1921, they would inform the German government of their
obligations. At that time, they would determine Germany’s resources and capacities.
The payments were to take place during 1919, 1920 and the first four months of 1921 in
the equivalent of 20,000,000,000 gold marks.
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In response to the treaty, the leader of the German Peace Delegation, Count von
Brockdorff-Rantzau wrote a letter to President Georges Clemenceau, in which he
explained that Germany was “firmly resolved to do everything in our power with a view
of fulfilling the grave obligations which we had undertaken.” 38 He stated in his letter that
Germany had agreed to the peace conference, “hoping for the peace of justice which had
been promised to [them].” 39 Instead, however, the German government was given a draft
of the treaty in which they were horribly and spitefully punished. He continued saying
that the “exactions of this treaty are more than the German people can bear.” 40 He argued
against the taking portions of Prussia for Poland since those territories were 100%
German. Brockdorff-Rantzau also said that he could understand why Saar or LorraineAlsace must go to France, although he states that Germany owes the debts to France “in
coal only, not in men.” 41
One of the counter-proposals, which Brockdorff-Rantzau proposed was that
Germany proceed with disarmament in advance of the other countries in order to “usher
in the new era of the peace of justice.” 42 He also pointed out that Germany was willing
to make reparation payments not exceeding 1,000,000,000 gold marks but without
interest. To replace river boats which were destroyed in Belgium and France, the
German government offered to replace the boats from Germany’s own resources.
Germany wanted to be judged fairly and by an impartial judge, but the only problem was
that the world had been involved and the League of Nations was clearly not impartial.
As previously mentioned the Weimar Republic was proclaimed before the
constitution could even have been planned. As a result, the constitution followed closely
the models which had preceded it. The first article of the state, much like the preamble of
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the Declaration of Independence, states that the “the power of the state emanates from the
people.” 43 In the second main part of the constitution, the basic rights and obligations of
Germans are laid out. The constitution, like other democratic constitutions, ensured the
individual rights such as freedom of speech and assembly to every citizen.
The national identity of foreign language communities in Germany was protected,
maybe most importantly including the right to use their native language in education,
administration, and the judicial system. 44 This article became important for the Jewish
communities as they sought to be integrated as Germans but also to remain Jewish. The
ability to retain their own national identity and still be considered part of Germany would
have had an enormous impact and a cause for hope among the Jews.
There were other articles which guaranteed the freedom of belief and conscience.
The free practice of religion was granted by the constitution and protected by the state.
In this the Jews had to see the promise of a future in Germany, unified with the Germans
without the discrimination of the Jewish religion and culture.
Despite the similarity of the Weimar Constitution with other similar documents it
was described by historian William Shirer, in his book, The Rise and Fall of the Third
Reich, as “on paper, the most liberal and democratic document of its kind the twentieth
century had ever seen…full of ingenious and admirable devices which seemed to
guarantee the working of an almost flawless democracy,” 45 However, with such high
hopes, there could only be one certainty…that not all of those high ideals would be
attained.
However, despite the seemingly fleeting perfection which the constitution seemed
to promise, prominent leaders of the Jewish community grasped the moment in history so
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that they might be able to might a difference in the aftermath constitution and in the
prelude to the treaty. The Weimar government was willing to attempt anything to
prevent League of Nations from dealing with them ruthlessly, but as it became apparent
that that would not happen the matter was dropped in the halls of the government, but the
issue continued to be an important topic for many people in the country, both Jewish and
German alike.
Those persons include a rising Nazi, Alfred Rosenberg (1919); Martin Buber
(1921); German-Jewish writer, Arnold Zweig (1922); S. Steinberg, (1922). There were
those who lived in the Weimar Republic and were obviously anti-Semitic and were key
characters to the future Nazi movement. Alfred Rosenberg was one of those people in
particular. Rosenberg was known as one of the main authors of key Nazi ideological
creeds, including its racial theory, persecution of the Jews, and opposition to degenerate
modern art. 46 He presents the problem of the Jews as a threat to the German way of life
in an article first published in Auf gut Deutsch entitled Die Russich-Juedische Revolution
(The Russian-Jewish Revolution). 47 As in his example of the Revolution, he believes that
the power of the “homogenous” race would diminish the power of the Germanic ideals.
Rosenberg states that the problem is due to the Europeans wish to be tolerant and
humanitarian and it gives the Jew so much of this power. They wield it cunningly and
effectively to their own ends while spinning tales of benefits for others. He closes his
article with the fact that now all of the people of Russia justly hate the Jews and when the
current regime decays, all the Jews will be killed by the new government officials, and
those who are not killed will flee and since Poland carefully guards its borders against
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them, they will flee to Germany, and here with cynicism, Rosenberg concludes, where
they are loved and “the warmest seats are kept for them.” 48
Martin Buber, who was an advocate of cultural Zionism and the need for Jews in
Germany to stay Jewish and German, explains the need and differences in nationalism
and what it truly means to be nationalistic. He states that “people” is defined as a group
with a unified fate. He then states that a people becomes a nation when they recognize
that they are separate and unique from other peoples and then acts upon it. He states that
true nationalism is expressed when a people become self-aware and that self-awareness
translates into action. 49 However, Buber cautions that true nationalism is used to correct
a deficiency, and when it is used beyond that it becomes a disease. He states that Jewry
exists as a nation even without a particular plot of land. He suggests that the Jews belong
to a community of faith and therefore have no need further of nationalism for a country,
and indeed, that it is presumptuous of the Jewish people to strive for more than their
community of faith. Hence furthering the gap, which had separated the Jews from others
such as the German and made it more difficult for those outside of the community of faith
to fully understand the Jews.
As a pre-cursor to heightening of problems in Germany, Arnold Zweig, who was
a German-Jewish writer and an anti-war activist, writes about the treatment of the Jews in
Lithuania in 1922. He describes the cruelties against the Lithuanian Jews, about the
executions and murder, about the whip and the club. He explains that in the villages the
atrocities still happen, it is just that there is not railroad and telegraph for it to be
broadcasted. He would help the eastern Jews, but every word they speak is deemed to be
a lie and German politics among those who have the power and authority to actually help.
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He ends with “May the taste of blood on the tongue of the man-eating bull of Europe
soon disappear.” 50 Sadly, and ironically, it would not disappear for many years and in
some places it still lingers, and many more Jews have died.
In the First World War, Jewish soldiers fought alongside their German comradesin-arms, S. Steinberg states that many Jews have died for the Fatherland of Germany. So
why are they being so unjustly treated? They have sacrificed their lives to keep Germany
strong. The Jewish soldiers “suffered death for the fatherland and slumber [still] in
foreign ground.” 51 They have striven for the treasure of fatherland and faith. And now,
after all the lives sacrificed, the Jews were still subject to anti-Semitism which called into
question their Germanness. Yet when called to do so the Jewish front soldiers did not
hesitate to lay down their own lives so that Germany might live.
“Die Deutsche Geist” (The German Spirit) was printed in 1924 in Das Tagebuch,
a Jewish journal. The German spirit, which defined and motivated Germany to be
German, would be severely lacking if it lost its “electrifying” Jewish element. The
editorial goes on to quote an article in Deutsche Zeitung (German Newspaper), which
was written about the ultra-German writer, Hermann Stehr’s sixtieth birthday. Most of
the people who went to celebrate the birthday and who spoke in honor of Stehr were
Jews, and the article in Deutsche Zeitung said that all the present Germans were “pained
by the repetition of the same spectacle...” referring to the Jews speaking rather than more
Germans. 52
“The German Spirit” concludes with a reaffirmation of the fact that German
culture and German society would be sadly lacking if not for the Jewish influence in
both. The German nationalists could have listed still other examples as well as
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Hauptmann and Stehr to prove that without German Jews the best minds of Germany
would have gone without an examination. With all the contributions from Einstein,
Freud, and others, the German culture flourished. The article points out rather
humorously that “as soon as a German mind outgrew the realm of normal mediocrity, it
was the German Jews, who first took note and applauded. The world of the German
spirit, robbed of the Jews, would become sleepy and dull.” 53
The future vindictive conditions of the Treaty of Versailles afforded the leaders of
the German Jewish community the opportunity to bring before the government the
discrimination and anti-Semitism, with which the Jews had to deal. Despite the fact that
the Weimar government did not hold future conferences to further discuss the Jewish
question, the Jewish population of Germany did receive full citizenship rights. The first
taste of democracy in Germany, although it only lasted for a short fourteen years, granted
more rights than had been enjoyed in the previous hundred or more years. The
Enlightenment laid out the ideals of a society and the Weimar Republic, with the urging
of the Jews, helped to see it come to pass. The conference is evidence that the democracy
of Weimar Republic was an attempt at flawless perfection by which the leaders in the
German Jewish community hoped to gain a less discriminatory world for the Jews.
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